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Abstract
Group-centrality is an emerging area in Network Science which seeks to quan-
tify the importance of nodes within and between communities. Previous group-
centrality measures either have strong theoretical underpinnings in community
detection, or scale well, but not both. We propose an extremely scalable mea-
sure, modularity-impact, that is directly derived from Newman’s modularity. Un-
like other measures, modularity-impact is signed, providing additional informa-
tion about each node’s role: hub within its community, or bridge between com-
munities. We analyze our results in a network robustness framework, as it is a
generalized version of immunization under SIR models, which prior works have
used for evaluation. We show that our measure out-performs previous measures
for immunizing strategies in generated networks with strong community structure.
Additionally, we show that our measure gives the most effective attack strategy for
a million-node infrastructure network, fragmenting it while removing less than 2%
of nodes. This is over 8 times more fragile than can be seen with previous group-
centralities. We further find that the social media communication network demon-
strates extreme robustness to group-centrality attacks, suggesting that user-based
interventions to mitigate misinformation diffusion will be ineffective. Finally, we
show that our group-centrality measure can be used as a greedy solution to the
community deception problem.
1 Introduction
Network Science provides the tools to model complex interacting components in a generalized way.
This generality has allowed Network Science to make impacts in a across many domains. A key
phenomena in network theory is that of modular networks. Networks from a wide array of dis-
ciplines exhibit modular structure, meaning clusters of nodes that are more tightly connected with
each other than to other clusters [12]. Discovery of these clusters have been repeatedly shown shown
to be meaningful within their context though empirical studies. Thus, the problem of community
detection has been a large part of the field of Network Science.
Another fundamental question in Network Science is that of centrality. Put simply, which nodes in
a network are important? This question can be answered using centrality measures, which measure
a node’s position in a network. Typically, centrality measures are either “local” or “global.” Local
measures look only in a node’s immediate neighborhood, and are thus scalable. The simplest of
these is degree, which simply counts a node’s neighbors. Global measures look at the entire graph
to calculate centrality. Betweenness, for example, counts the number of shortest paths a node appears
in. While global measures are often more powerful, they are computationally expensive, and have
difficulty scaling to large networks.
Since network groups have been shown to be pervasive in nature, it is natural to ask the question:
which node is important given a network and its grouping? Group-centrality measures answer this
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question by combining classical centrality measures with the given group structure. The question of
group-centrality lies at the intersection of the fundamental area of centrality and community struc-
ture. As such, applications to group-centrality are far-ranging. In this work, we show applications to
immunization strategies for infectious disease, robustness testing for large infrastructure networks,
and privacy-based data filtering strategies.
For classical centralities, a node’s importance is measured by a single positive number. However,
for group-centrality, there are two ways in which a node can be central: within its community
and between communities. This is widely recognized in group-centrality measures, however these
existing measures still only give a single positive value [10, 11, 13, 21]. The typical approach for a
group-centrality measure is to take a weighted sum of classical centralities on links within group and
links between groups [10, 11, 13]. With only a single positive number, it is unclear whether a node is
an important hub, bridge, or combination. Further, the weighting schemes have been hand-crafted,
rather than derived from existing community theory.
To resolve these issues, we proposed modularity-impact. Modularity-impact is a group centrality
measure directly derived from the modularity function, the basis for the most popular community
detection algorithms. The measure is scalable, with computation of all nodes scaling as O(M +
NC) time, where M is the number of links, N is the number of nodes, and C is the number
of communities. From the derived equation, contributions of a node as a hub and a bridge are
automatically weighted, leading to a signed measure. This is similar to the work on signed networks,
which have been recognized as a useful way to encode the type of a relationship, particularly on
social media [17, 28]. Here, the networks are unsigned but the resulting centrality is. In classic
centrality, a signed measure would not be useful. However for group-centrality, our signed measure
can simultaneously convey the magnitude of a node’s importance as well as its role as a hub or
bridge.
Modularity-impact was tested on generated modular networks, and on two real-world networks:
the Pennsylvania Road Network, and a large Twitter network collected from the discussion of the
Canadian Election of 2019. In our experiments, modularity-impact out-performs existing group-
centralities, showing potential applications to immunization strategies, controlling diffusion over
networks, and in robustness testing.
While other studies have demonstrated the fragility of infrastructure networks, in this work, we
show that the road network is over 8 times more fragile than could be seen with existing group-
centrality measures [9]. By targeting only 1.6% of nodes with highest modularity impact, the PA
road network’s largest component can be reduced to less than 1% of its original size, effectively
destroying the network.
In the second case-study, the social media communication network was extremely robust, as demon-
strated through the ineffectiveness of all group-centrality attacks on the network. Robustness of
twitter networks have serious implications for Social Cybersecurity [5, 20]. One of the core areas
in this emerging discipline is developing counter-measures for the mitigation of fake or misleading
news on social media. The problem of “Fake News” has gotten more attention recently, though
many basic questions in the space are left open [16]. It is often suggested that network metrics
can be used to identify points for stopping the spread of misinformation [25]. However, our results
suggest that this is not the case. The robustness of Twitter networks suggest that even well-targeted
interventions at the user level are unable to hamper the ability of information to spread quickly. This
result is inline with the observed phenomena that misinformation continually resurfaces on social
media [24].
Lastly, we show that mod-impact can be used to perform greedy attacks to decrease modular-
ity, giving a solution to the community-deception problem. Modularity-Impact was used perform
community-deception on a large twitter network. The method decreased modularity by 28%, how-
ever this decrease comes at the cost of 1% of nodes and 20% of edges. This suggests that an effective
strategy for community deception is to obscure which popular accounts a user follows. While a re-
moval of 1% of nodes leads to a sizable decrease in modularity, this process has diminishing returns.
These results further confirm the importance of group-centrality. Modularity-impact also gives the
following insights to modular networks: A node’s importance is not based only how many groups
it is connected to, but also which groups those are. While some nodes act as both group-hubs and
community bridges, they are often one or the other. To stop diffusion, immunizing community
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bridges is more effective than community hubs; communities, when cut off, can act as silos from
which disease cannot escape.
2 Prior Work
2.1 Modularity and Grouping
The most common definition of modularity is that given by Newman, which is the fraction of the
edges that fall within the given groups minus the expected fraction if edges were distributed at
random [22]. The definition of Newman modularity is as follows.
Definition 2.1. Let G = (V,E) be a graph where V is a set of vertices, and E of is a set of links.
Let us denote N = |V | as the total number of nodes and M = |E| as total number of links in the
graphG. Let us define modularity as the fraction of the edges that fall within the given groups minus
the expected fraction if edges were distributed at random [22]. We can write modularity Q of the
graph G as:
Q(G) =
1
2M
∑
v,w
(
Av,w − kvkw
2M
)
δ(cv, cw), (1)
where A the adjacency matrix, kv total degree of node v, cv is the community of node v, and δ(a, b)
is the Kronecker delta function.
Modularity in this form has been studied extensively, and the most commonly used community de-
tection algorithms seek to maximize this quantity [3]. Because it is an NP-hard problem, many
different methods have been proposed to varying degrees of success [1, 7, 26]. The Louvain method
has prevailed for years, and has repeatedly been shown to give meaningful communities in empiri-
cally studies [1].
However, recently, Traag, Waltman, van Eck have shown a flaw in the Louvain method [26]. Because
of its update step, Louvain does not guarantee that its communities are internally connected. It was
shown that, in fact, many communities are often not connected when using the method on real-world
datasets. To fix this, Traag, Waltman, and van Eck have proposed Leiden grouping, which is slightly
faster than Louvain, guarantees well-connected communities, and often achieves higher modularity.
As such, we proceed using Leiden grouping.
2.2 Network Centrality Measures
A fundamental question in Network Science is, Which nodes are important? Many metrics and
centrality measures have been created to answer this question in different ways [27]. Some measures
are local, meaning that each node’s value is only dependent on its neighbors. These metrics are
highly scalable but have limited value in explaining more complex structure. The most common of
these measures is node degree, or the number of neighbors a node has. More powerful measures
are global, which incorporate structure beyond just a node’s neighborhood. A common example is
betweenness, which is the number of shortest paths that pass through a node. Some of these metrics
are very computationally expensive, and are thus intractable for large graphs.
Newman began the discussion of centrality based on community structure when studying the mod-
ularity matrix [21]. He defined “community-centrality” based on the eigenvectors of the Modularity
matrix. Despite its name, this is a classical centrality measure. Instead of measuring the actual
contribution of a node, community-centrality measures a node’s potential to impact modularity.
The derivation from the modularity matrix give community-centrality a strong theoretical link to
communities, but has some drawbacks. Potential impact can be very different from actual impact.
Communities may be defined in different ways, however no matter the communities, nodes all re-
ceive the same value of community centrality. From a practical standpoint, the modularity matrix is
dense, making it memory inefficient for very large graphs. Additionally, the use of eigenvalues and
eigenvectors makes it a “global” measure. Approximations, then, are typically needed large graphs.
Measures which take communities into account are called group-centrality measures. They ask:
which nodes are important given these communities? When communities are introduced, importance
takes two forms: importance within a community, and importance between communities. Typically,
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both types of importance are calculated, and a weighted sum is taken to obtain a final value. This
makes comparison easy, but loses the type of importance.
Masuda takes an eigenvalue approach, though not one derived from modularity [19]. Instead, he
builds off of the idea of dynamical importance [23]. Restrepo et al. note that the largest eigenvalue
of a graph’s adjacency matrix is to the ease of diffusion over the graph [23]. Based on this, they order
node’s based on the change in eigenvalue from the node’s removal. To leverage group structure, Ma-
suda applied this strategy to the group-to-group network, calling it the “mod-strategy.” This method
is computationally efficient since only the only eigenvalue needed is the largest one, and because it
is calculated on the group network, which is far smaller than the actual network. Formally, nodes
were ordered based the following equation:
Masi = (2u˜ci − x)
∑
c 6=ci
u˜ck
c
i (2)
x =
1
λ˜
∑
c6=ci
u˜ck
c
i , (3)
where kci =
∑
j∈cAi,j is number of connections from node i to community c, λ˜ is the group
network’s largest eigenvalue, and u˜ is its corresponding eigenvector. Intuitively, the value of the
eigenvector corresponds to the importance of that group. Thus, Masuda’s method gives importance
to nodes based on the group it belongs to, and its connectivity to other important groups. The more
connections to important groups, the higher the score, meaning that nodes bridging communities
will be ranked highly. This is a common across most group-centralities.
More recently, degree-based measures have taken favor, due to their interpretable form and their
scalability. To get at the relationship within and between communities, these measures use internal
degree and external degree: kinternali = k
ci
i , and k
external
i =
∑
c6=ci k
c
i .
One of the earlier examples is “commn-centrality,”CC, proposed by Gupta et al [13]. This centrality
is defined as follows:
CCi =
(
1− µc|c|
)
kinternali
maxj∈ci kinternalj
×Rci +
(
1 +
µc
|c|
)(
kexternali
maxj∈ci kexternalj
×Rci
)2
(4)
µc =
∑
i∈c
kinternali
ki
, (5)
where R is user-defined, but is commonly chosen as Rci = maxj∈ci k
internal
j . The weighting param-
eter µ is selected such that internal degree takes precedence for weak groups, and out degree takes
precedence for strong groups. One issue with commn-centrality, however, arises when a community
is disconnected from the rest of the graph. In such a case, maxj∈c kexternalj = 0, so commn-centrality
is undefined. This commonly occurs, especially during network robustness testing.
Afterword, Ghalmane et al. have proposed a number of alternatives which are well defined for
community components [11, 10]. The simplest of which is the number of neighboring communities
centrality, which just counts the number of communities in a node’s immediate neighborhood, we
will call it bi. Expanding on this, the community hub-bridge centrality, β was defined as:
βi = |ci|kinternali + bikexternali (6)
where, again, bi is the number of communities neighboring node i. [11].
Generalizing this approach beyond just degree, Ghalmane et al. introduce “modular-centrality”.
They note that a graph G can be decomposed into Ginternal and Gexternal, where only the internal or
external links are retained, respectively. Then, internal centrality can be calculated as: Γinternal(G) =
Γ(Ginternal), where Γ is a classical centrality measure. The same logic can be used to obtain external
centrality. It can be seen that when Γ, is selected to be the degree, we get the same internal and
external centrality measures as before. Finally, modular-centrality is the weighted sum of these:
αi = µciΓ
internal
i + (1− µci)Γexternali , (7)
where µci is, again, the fraction of internal links for community ci. Note that this is the opposite
weighting scheme as Gupta’s; when communities are strong, modular-centrality places preference
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to internal degrees. We also see Masuda’s weighting giving preference to bridges. To cover the
full spectrum of these previous group-centralities, we also consider an adjusted version of modular-
centrality, where the weighting scheme favors bridges:
α∗i = (1− µci)Γinternali + µciΓexternali , (8)
With the exception of Masuda’s work, these methods all rely on a weighting scheme of internal and
external centrality. The weightings are not derived from network-theoretic principles, but are based
on observations seen in network studies. Ideally, a centrality would be derived from established
theory, and would eliminate the need for comparison of subjective weighting. While Masuda’s
measure is derived from network theory, it is based on network connectivity, rather than community
detection.
Here, we show that a local group-centrality measure can be derived directly from the modularity
equation, the measure which much of community detection is based. Because it is localized, it has
time complexity of O(M +NC), providing scalability of measures like commn and modular, while
maintaining the theoretic link to community detection. At the same time, our modularity-derived
measure is signed. Negative values indicate more hub-like, while positive indicate more bridge-like.
Thus, unlike other measures, modularity-impact shows both how central a node is and what way the
node is central. Further, when direct comparison is needed, a simple absolute value can be taken to
rank the nodes.
2.3 Evaluation: SIR Models and Network Robustness
Evaluation of centrality measures can be subjective, since different measures may be useful for
different tasks. However, many of the prior group-centrality measures have been evaluated from an
immunology perspective [10, 11, 13, 19]. In this scenario, a disease is spreading over a network.
The centrality measure in question is used to determine which node’s are given immunity. Then, the
“best” centrality measure is that which leads to the smallest outbreak. The fundamental assumption
is that central nodes will be spreaders, so immunizing them should result in smaller outbreaks.
Typically, the most basic epidemic model is used: the SIR model [15]. In this model, each node
is either susceptible, infected, or recovered. After an initial node is infected, it infects in neighbors
with probability p. At the same time, the infected nodes can recover with probability γ. Recovered
nodes are no longer susceptible, and can no longer spread the disease. The simulation is iterated on
until there are no infected nodes remaining. The number of nodes that were ever infected is called
the epidemic size. By immunizing nodes, the epidemic size can be decreased. It is the goal, then, to
pick an immunization strategy that leads to the smallest epidemic size.
Simulations of this type are closely related to the sub-field of Network Robustness. Network Robust-
ness refers to how a network responds to attacks. Understanding how networks react with missing
nodes or edges has important implications in many fields, including but not limited to biology and
ecology. Attacks typically take the form of removal of edges or removal of nodes. We will focus on
removal of nodes.
One method of evaluating an attack’s effectiveness is through network fragmentation [8]. Fragmen-
tation, σ can be defined as the size of the remaining largest component Nρ relative to the initial
size of the graph, N , where ρ is the fraction of nodes removed. Fragmentation can then be given as
σ(ρ) =
Nρ
N . This is a useful measure because networks often rely on connectivity to function prop-
erly. Disconnected components in biological, communication, or power-grid networks are serious
danger of failing completely.
Now, we can see that immunization strategies are effectively network attacks. By immunizing a
node, it and its links are removed from the network. Immunizing many nodes fragments the network,
slowing diffusion. In fact, the fragmentation, σ, is the worst-case scenario for an SIR model. Given
the right parameterization, the disease in an SIR model will infect all nodes in the component the
disease initialized in. If the initial node is in the largest component, the worse-case scenario is that
all nodes in the largest component get infected. Thus, σ can be used to measure the effectiveness of
an immunization strategy without the need for expensive SIR simulations.
From a network robustness perspective, different types of attacks have been developed. In general,
a centrality measure is calculated for each of the nodes, and the node with the highest centrality is
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removed, or immunized. Early studies looked at node attacks based on degree [4]. Later, Holme
generalized this idea along with two styles of attacks: initial and recomputed [14]. In the initial case,
centralities are calculated once and the top-k nodes are removed. In the recomputed case, centralities
are recomputed each time a node is removed. This makes the attack more expensive to compute, but
more effective.
In this framework, attacks are defined by two characteristics, the centrality measure and the style.
Common choices of centrality measure are degree and betweenness. Betweenness has been shown to
be much more damaging to a network, but is far more expensive to compute [9, 14]. The shorthand
for these methods are based on the acronym of the centrality and style; IB means an attack using
initial calculation of betweenness centrality, while RD is recomputed degree.
A connection between the modular structure in networks and their robustness has been illustrated
by da Cuna et al. in [9]. The authors developed a more complex attack strategy which is able to
fragment real-world networks far more quickly than the simple methods previously described. They
achieve this by insuring that nodes are attacked only when they are in the largest component and
when they are connecting groups. This strategy is called a Module-Based-Attack, MBA.
Though effective, attacks using betweenness centrality do not scale to the size of networks com-
monly seen on social media. For weighted networks, a single calculation of betweenness scales as
O(NM+N2 logN), making RB scale asO(N2M+N3 logN) [2]. This makes RB intractable for
medium-sized networks, which is why da Cunha et al. use IB as the base for their attack method [9].
However, even IB is intractable for very large networks. Additionally, the computation of largest
component at every step adds to the methods complexity. The most scalable methods are those that
use an “initial” strategy with a local measure.
Based on this, we use fragmentation to evaluate our method in comparison to the following
measures: Masuda (Mas), Community-Hub-Bridge (CHB), Modular-Centrality-Degree (MC-D),
Adjusted-Modular-Centrality-Degree (AMC-D), and Degree (Deg). Evaluation is performed in
three steps. In the first, networks are generated to measure how different group centralities per-
form under varying attack strategies. In this step “initial,” “repeated,” and “module-based” attacks
are performed. Second, the Pennsylvania road network is studied. This is a large highly modular
network, which exemplifies the power of group-centrality measures. Finally, a large Twitter com-
munication network is studied from the Canadian Elections of 2019. Here, the robustness of social
media networks is demonstrated. In the second and third steps, only “initial” strategies are taken
due to the size of the networks.
2.4 Community Deception
Community Deception has recently been formalized by Chen et al [6].They argue community detec-
tion is a very powerful tool, and could potentially be too powerful for privacy-sensitive applications.
In order to prevent data sensitive data that is easily identifiable, community structure should be ob-
scured. They then develop a genetic algorithm that attempts to determine which nodes or edges to
hide such that the modularity is decreased the most. Genetic algorithms, however, are extremely
complex and thus do not scale. Because of this, experiments were only performed on networks with
approximately 100 nodes.
Given that it is a combinatorial optimization problem, we cannot expect a true solution. However,
flipping the robustness problem around gives an accurate and cheap greedy solution. Instead of
attacking nodes which will increase modularity the most, nodes are attacked which decrease modu-
larity the most. We demonstrate the power of this approach by performing community deception on
a social media communication network with 7.5 million nodes, and 130 million edges.
3 Calculating Modularity-Impact
Newman’s community centrality measured a nodes potential to contribute to modularity. To calcu-
late the actual contribution, we can calculate the modularity if that node was to be removed from
the network, and then look at the change during removal. This seems to be a natural approach given
that other group-centralities are measured by procedures involving the removal of nodes. Note that
once a node is removed, the network could be re-grouped, and the group structure could potentially
be quite different. Once regrouping is considered, there is no closed-form solution to what the new
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modularity would be, since the maximization procedure would need to be re-run. Thus, regrouping
is typically not considered, and we do not consider it here [19].
First, we re-write Equation 1. From the definition of modularity we can write:
Q(G) =
1
2M
∑
v,w
(
Av,w − 1
2M
kvkw
)
δ(cv, cw)
=
1
2M
∑
c∈C
∑
v,w∈c
(
Av,w − 1
2M
kvkw
)
=
1
2M
∑
c∈C
∑
v,w∈c
Av,w︸ ︷︷ ︸
2M internal
− 1
4M2
∑
c∈C
∑
v,w∈c
kvkw,
where C is the set of communities, and M internal denotes total number of edges that fall within the
given groups.
Q(G) =
M internal
M
− 1
4M2
∑
c∈C
∑
v,w∈c
kvkw
=
M internal
M
− 1
4M2
∑
c∈C
∑
v∈c
kv
∑
w∈c
kw
Let
dc =
∑
v∈c
kv =
∑
w∈c
kw
Now can express modularity in terms of number of links and total degrees of nodes:
Q =
M internal
M
− 1
4M2
∑
c∈C
d2c (9)
This form is easier to derive the new modularities from.
Theorem 3.1. If we remove node i from the graph G then the new modularity of the new graph Gi
can be written as:
Q(Gi) =
M internal − kinternali
M − ki −
1
4 (M − ki)2
∑
c∈C
(dc − hi,c)2 (10)
hi,c = k
c
i + kiδ(c, ci). (11)
The value hi,c measures the number of edges a node has to that community, and if the node is a
member of said community, its degree is added. The degree must be added because dc double-counts
the number of internal links in a community.
Proof. The removal of node i from graph G results in a new graph, Gi. Equation 9 can then be
applied to graph on graph Gi to find the new modularity:
Q(Gi) =
M internal − kinternali
M − ki −
1
4 (M − ki)2
∑
c∈C
d˜2i,c
Now to calculate d˜i,c we can break this down in two cases:
Case 1. If c 6= ci we have :
d˜i,c =
∑
v∈c
kv − kci
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Case 2. If c = cn we have :
d˜i,c =
∑
v∈c
kv − kci − ki
Let :
hi,c = k
c
i + kiδ(c, ci)
then finally we have:
d˜i,c = dc − hi,c
Giving us the final expression for the modularity once node i is removed:
Q(Gi) =
M internal − kinternali
M − ki −
1
4 (M − ki)2
∑
c∈C
(dc − hi,c)2 

Now, the new-modularity is all that is needed to order nodes based on their centrality, but calculating
the difference in modularity gives a more interesting measure:
∆Qi = Q(Gi)−Q(G), (12)
we refer to this measure, ∆Q(G,Gi), as the modularity-impact of node i. Once the difference is
taken, it becomes apparent which nodes are increasing modularity and which are decreasing it. As
Newman noted, nodes can have a large positive and negative impact simultaneously [21]. Previous
methods might just add the absolute value of the two, but Equation 10, balances the two, to see which
contribution prevails for each node. Because of the difference, nodes with positive mod-impact
are bridging communities. Their removal increases the strength of communities, thus increasing
modularity. Conversely, nodes with negative mod-impact are hubs within communities; without
them modularity falls.
Like many previous measures, modularity-impact is correlated with degree. As node degree in-
creases, the denominator decreases, leading to increase in the magnitude of mod-impact. However,
modularity-impact is more complex since it takes into account which groups a node connects. Nodes
connecting larger groups have a bigger impact than those connecting smaller groups.
4 Methodology
4.1 Fragmentation-Based Evaluation
Previous group-centrality measures have been evaluated using SIR models of diffusion [11, 13]. In
these works, the high-centrality nodes are immunized, and thus removed from the network. Then,
SIR simulations are run, and the effectiveness of the immunization is quantified by the epidemic
size, the total number of nodes infected. While this method is interesting, SIR models have two
parameters that must be tested for, and simulations must be repeated many times to get an accurate
average epidemic size. This results in a lot of computation, and results that depend on the type of
diffusion occurring.
A similar line of research is network robustness. Recently, da Cunha et al. have shown that module-
based attacks (MBA’s) on networks can effectively fragment a network. Fragmentation, σ, is the size
of the largest component after the attack, divided by the original largest component. Fragmentation
is measured as a function of ρ, the fraction of nodes removed in the attack: σ(ρ) = LρL . Similarly,
fragmentation can be looked at as a function of the fraction of edges removed, η. Note that here we
are only targeting nodes, not edges, but the fraction of remaining edges is still an interesting quantity
to study, as we see in Section 5.3.
Network Fragmentation provides a simulation-free method of evaluating immunization strategies.
SIR models usually assume that the simulation begins with a single infected node. So, no matter
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what the parameters of the SIR model are, the epidemic size is upper-bounded by the size of the
largest component. This means that fragmentation measures the worst-case epidemic size, regardless
of the diffusion parameters.
An immunizations strategy’s effectiveness depends on how many nodes are removed, as seen by the
notation σ(ρ). To measure the overall effectiveness, the fragmentation function can be integrated.
The lower the integral, the more effective the strategy, so we will call this the cost function that we
are trying to minimize: Cρ =
∫
ρ
σ(ρ)dρ. For comparison, the cost with respect to edges can be of
interest, though it is not directly being optimized: Cη =
∫
η
σ(η)dη.
Thus, we will evaluate all of the attack strategies in Section 4.2, using C. We will do so in three
parts: generated networks, the PA road network, and a twitter network obtained from user to user
conversations surrounding the Canadian Election of 2019. Each part highlights different aspects of
the proposed method.
4.2 Attack Strategies
Attack strategies are the rules that govern which nodes are to be immunized, or removed from the
network. Generally these strategies are independent of centrality measure, so can be paired with
any measure of a researcher’s choosing. Holme outlined two strategies: initial and repeated [14].
In the initial attack, a centrality measure is calculated for each of the nodes. Then, the top-k nodes
are selected to be attacked. While scalable, some attacks will be redundant. After the first node is
removed, the centralities of the following nodes change. So nodes that appear central might not be
if certain others are removed first.
The recomputed attack accounts for this. In a recomputed attack, the most central node is removed
first. Then, the centralities are recomputed before selecting the next most-central node. The process
is repeated until k nodes are removed. Though effective, the recompute step adds scalability issues.
For a centrality measure that takes O(M) time, the attack takes O(NM) time. This means for
expensive calculations like betweenness, the recompute strategy will be intractable, O(N3 logN)
for weighted networks [2].
A more sophisticated strategy is given by da Cuhna et al, called Module-Based-Attack (MBA) [9].
The authors find that use of group structure leads to effective fragmentation. Group-based struc-
ture is incorporated by only attacking nodes which bridge communities. Further, only nodes in
the current largest component are attacked. While largest component is recomputed, the centrality
measures are not. The full procedure is as follows:
Algorithm 1: Modularity Impact (MI)
Result: List of per-node modularity impacts MI
1 MI← ∅ ;
2 Q(G)← initial modularity of graph G;
3 for node ni in G do
4 Gi ← graph G without node ni;
5 ∆Qi ← Q(Gi)−Q(G);
6 MI←MI ∪(ni,∆Qi);
7 end
While not as complex as the recompute method, the update of the largest component and node
bridges adds to the complexity of the Algorithm 2
Thus, for small generated networks we take I, R, and MBA. For the PA-Road Network and Twit-
ter networks, however, only the “initial” attack strategy is computed, as it is the most scalable.
These are combined with degree as well as the previously discussed local group-centrality measures:
Masuda (Mas), Community-Hub-Bridge (CHB), Modular-Centrality-Degree (MC-D), Adjusted-
Modular-Centrality-Degree (AMC-D), and Degree (Deg). We compare these existing approaches
to modularity-impact in two forms. First, we take the original modularity-impact (MI), which tar-
gets bridges first, since hubs have a negative centrality value. Second, we consider the absolute value
of the modularity-impact (AMI), which targets nodes in centrality order regardless of their role.
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Algorithm 2: Module-Based-Attack (MBA)
Result: List of removed nodes L
1 L ← ∅;
2 B ← the set of nodes bridging communities in graph G;
3 S ← List of all nodes sorted by a centrality measure (function);
4 while |B| > 0 do
5 LC ← the largest component graph G;
6 τ ← top node in S;
7 if τ ∈ B and τ ∈ LC then
8 G← G with node τ removed;
9 LC ← largest component of G;
10 B ← the set of nodes bridging communities in graph G;
11 L ← L ∪ τ ;
12 S ← S \ τ ;
13 else
14 if τ /∈ B then
15 S ← S \ τ ;
16 else
17 S ← S⊕ τ
18 end
19 end
20 end
5 Network Fragmentation
5.1 Generated Networks
First, we compared group-centralities using generated networks. By using generated networks we
can repeat tests many times. We constructed modular networks using the cellular network model,
similar to that of Masuda [19]. In this model, “cells” are random sized Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks with
high density, simulating clusters. Then, the a cell-to-cell network is also modeled as an Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi network. When two cells are linked in the group-to-group network, random nodes from each
are selected and a link is drawn between them. This results in an unweighted, undirected random
network with community structure.
For this study, we used parameters shown in Table 1.
Variable Value Description
N 1000 Number of nodes
Nc U(10, 20) Number of cells
ni N (µ = N/Nc, σ2 = Nc/5), Number of nodes per cell
pi U(0.1, 0.25) Density of internal cell relationships
po U(0, 0.5) Density of the cell-to-cell network
Table 1: Cellular Network Parameters. U(a, b) denotes the uniform random distribution between
numbers a and b; N (µ, σ2) denotes the normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2.
The eight previously discussed group-centrality measures were paired with the three possible attack
schemes, initial, recomputed, and MBA, to give 24 attacks. Each time a network was generated all
24 attacks were performed on the network and the corresponding cost functions Cρ and Cη were
recorded. The average cost of the 24 attacks for 100 generated networks is given in Table 2. The
average modularity for these 100 networks when grouped with Leiden grouping was 0.91. The
modularity-impact attack consistently outperforms all other attacks both in terms of node cost and
edge cost, suggesting that it is the best group-centrality measure for this type of synthetic network.
The fact that attacking nodes with positive modularity-impact is more effective than nodes that
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Method MI AMI AMC-D Mas CHB MC-D Deg
Initial Cρ 0.165 0.211 0.169 0.198 0.383 0.381 0.347
Initial Cη 0.247 0.308 0.268 0.293 0.576 0.599 0.578
MBA Cρ 0.086 0.087 0.088 0.090 0.101 0.103 0.100
MBA Cη 0.157 0.162 0.173 0.162 0.211 0.219 0.216
Recomputed Cρ 0.107 0.126 0.130 0.132 0.331 0.337 0.309
Recomputed Cη 0.188 0.205 0.221 0.205 0.608 0.616 0.586
Table 2: Results for attacks on the generated cellular networks. The values shown are the average
over 100 simulations. Methods introduced in this work are on the left of the double column. The
best results are emboldened.
are high in mod-impact magnitude suggests that community bridge nodes are more important than
community hub nodes in cellular networks. The success of the “adjusted” modular-degree centrality
provides further evidence of this, since it places greater importance on community bridges, while
the original modular-degree focuses on hubs and does not score as well.
5.2 PA-Road Network
One particularly well-suited application for group-centrality measures is the analysis of large in-
frastructure networks. These networks typically have two properties: very high modularity, and
low maximum degree. High modularity, makes group-based approaches appropriate. Low maxi-
mum degree often means that simple degree-based attacks will be ineffective. Additionally, their
large size make effective approaches like MBA intractable, or at least very costly. Instead, we show
that initial-attacks with group-centrality measures are very effective, and that our modularity-based
methods are the most effective by far.
As an example, we use the Pennsylvania Road Network [18]. Roads are represented by edges,
while intersections are represented by nodes. This network has 1,088,092 nodes, and 1,541,898
edges. When grouped with Leiden grouping maximizing modularity, 499 clusters are obtained with
a modularity of 0.990. Its maximum degree is 18. The extremely high modularity and low maximum
degree make it an ideal candidate for group-centrality measures.
(a) Fragmentation by nodes removed. (b) Fragmentation by edges removed.
Figure 1: Fragmentation of the PA-Road Network. Fragmentation as a function of fraction of nodes
removed is given on the left. The same is shown on the right, but as a function of the fraction of
remaining edges. Results for mod-impact, absolute mod-impact, and adjusted modular-centrality
are extremely similar, so overlap on both figures. The legend in (b) also applies to the plot in (a), as
well as both plots in Figure 2.
In Figure 1, we see the fragmentation as a function of nodes and edges removed for each strategy.
Here, we see the largest component can be effectively brought to zero by removing 1.6% of nodes
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with the highest modularity-impact values. Removing only positive mod-impact nodes and remov-
ing nodes based on the absolute value of their mod-impact value give very similar results. The
quantitative results, as measured by Cρ, and Cη , are given in Table 3.
Additionally, we show the plot as a function of edges removed, for the same strategies. The edge
plot shows that while modularity-impact fragments the networks best given a number of nodes, it is
also most efficient in terms of edges.
With just a degree-based attack, it would appear that the Pennsylvania road network is robust. In
fact, the group-centrality methods show that it is quite fragile. Using an I-MD attack, the network
can be almost completely fragmented by targeting only 1.6% percent of nodes, bringing the largest
component down to less than 1% of its original size. This improves over the previous best measure,
modular-degree, by a factor of over 8.5.
5.3 Canadian Election Twitter Network
Another relevant application of group-centrality is social media networks. Since social media has
become so embedded in everyday life, scalable tools to understand it are essential. Given the increas-
ing polarization of online discussion, as described in concepts like filter bubbles, it is not enough
to know what actors are important in general. Instead, it is necessary to understand what actors are
important within and between key online communities. Group-centralities make this a measurable
problem.
To study the effectiveness of our group-centrality measures we again use network fragmentation, due
to its connection with diffusion. Diffusion on social media is an important phenomena to understand
as a way to combat misinformation, among other things. Users who fragment the network when
removed, are those who have the most power to spread information.
For this study, we use the network created from Twitter data collected during 2019 Canadian federal
election. The goal was to obtain a user to user communication network where users were active in
political discussion. First, we used a keyword search of Twitter’s API to collect tweets related to the
Canadian Election during the month of October. From here, the unique users were recorded, giving a
list of users active in political discussion. While a user to user network could be constructed with this
data, many links would be missing, since only tweets with our keywords can be used. To construct
a more complete network, Twitter’s API was used to scrape the timelines of all users in our list.
This new collection was then truncated to the week of the election. Finally, the all-communication
graph was computed from this dataset, where link weights are the sum of the mentions, retweets, and
quotes. The “Election Week” network, has 7,523,125 nodes, and 130,086,491 links. When grouped
with Leiden grouping, 557 communities were discovered, with a modularity of 0.691.
Figure 2 shows the fragmentation results on the election week network. Again, the quantitative re-
sults are given in Table 3. The Adjusted-Modular-Degree measure and the classical degree measure
effectively tie for node-based efficiency.
The structure and properties between the PA Roads network and the Election Week network are very
different. This difference is reflected in Figure 2. Perhaps most striking is how poorly the positive
modularity-impact method performs in terms of ρ. While other methods fragment the network
removing 10-30% of nodes, the positive modularity-impact method does not fragment the network
until nearly all nodes are removed.
At first this seems like a failure of the modularity-impact method. However, inspection of Figure 2
(b), shows otherwise. In terms of links, the modularity-impact method is actually the most efficient
attack strategy. This counter-intuitive result occurs because none of the methods are very effective
at fragmenting the network. The largest component is small when removing 10-30% of nodes using
the other methods, but those nodes account for over 95% of the networks links. In other words, the
election week network exhibits extreme robustness to these types of attacks.
5.4 Discussion
We see that modularity-based methods were very effective in all three studies. The modularity-
impact method shows that the PA Road network is over 8.5 times as fragile as could be seen with
existing measures. While the positive modularity-impact attack was effective on the PA-Road net-
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(a) Fragmentation by nodes removed. (b) Fragmentation by edges removed.
Figure 2: Fragmentation of the Election-Week Network. Fragmentation as a function of fraction of
nodes removed is given on the left. The right Figure shows the same but as a function of the fraction
of remaining edges. The legend can be found in Figure 1(b).
Network MI AMI AMC-D Mas CHB MC-D Deg
PA-Roads Cρ 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.169 0.157 0.111 0.122
PA-Roads Cη 0.020 0.026 0.026 0.300 0.281 0.243 0.305
Election Cρ 0.430 0.032 0.022 0.067 0.029 0.023 0.022
Election Cη 0.635 0.673 0.656 0.732 0.667 0.654 0.651
Table 3: Results for initial attacks on the PA-Road Network and the Canadian-Election Twitter
Network. Methods introduced in this work are on the left of the double column. The best results are
emboldened.
work, it was not on the Election week network. However, using the absolute-value of the modularity-
impact resolves the issue. This implies that attacking community-bridges is not enough. By taking
the absolute value, both community-bridges and community-hubs are attacked, leading to a method
that is more robust across networks, even if it might not be the top-performer for specific networks.
As much as the values of a centrality are important, often the ranking of node centralities takes
precedence. This is the case with network attacks studied in this work. So to go beyond the frag-
mentation results, the Kendall correlation of each method was calculated to compare the resulting
node-rankings [15]. Figures 3 and 4 show the correlations for the Road network and the Election
network, respectively. These correlations allow us to see the similarity of centrality ranking, regard-
less of the effectiveness of said ranking. Though more clear in Figure 3, we see that the existing
degree-based metrics are highly correlated. This is intuitive, as they are all alterations on a weighted
degree. While connecting certain groups might give a node a higher or lower score depending on
the metric, having a low total degree will lead to a low score in most cases.
Absolute modularity-impact has moderate correlation to the existing methods. Most notably, it has
strongest connections to the modular-degree centrality. However, the signed modularity-impact has
lower correlation. The combination of these observations show that modularity-impact are lever-
aging similar information as one of the most recent group centrality measures (modular-centrality
applied to degree), while giving those values a sign indicating the type of central role they are play-
ing: hub or bridge. The correlation between mod-impact and absolute mod-impact give further
information about a networks structure. In the road network, there is strong negative correlation
(-0.95), indicating that most nodes are community hubs, not bridges. The same is seen with the
election week network, though to a lesser extent since the correlation is -0.53. This result is con-
sistent with the networks high modularities, and that the road network’s modularity is much higher
than election week’s. This added information is a key contribution of the work, and will be of use
for deep dives into network data.
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Figure 3: Kendall-Tau Correlation of the “initial” attack strategies on the PA Roads Network.
Figure 4: Kendall-Tau Correlation of the “initial” attack strategies on the Election Week Network.
Lastly, we see that our adjusted version of the modular-degree centrality gives improvements over
the original modular-centrality, and that it has stronger correlations to the modularity-based methods.
Based on these results, it is possible that the generalized modular-centrality should also be adjusted
to favor bridges. In general, it seems that bridge-favoring methods have performed best in our
experiments. This is intuitive from a diffusion perspective. If a network is highly modular, the
groups themselves can act as silos to contain what is being diffused if the community-bridge nodes
are removed. For the road network, modular-centrality points to areas that need extra redundancy to
create a more robust transportation network.
From the social network, we see that targeting bridges is not always enough. In the presence of
community bridges and large community-hubs, an approach that attacks both is necessary. The
absolute modularity-impact method attacks both, but the election network was robust to even this
attack.
In the context of misinformation on social media, this means that both users acting as hubs within
fringe communities and users attempting to bridge communities play key roles. Further, in this con-
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text network robustness is both a strength and a weakness. A robustness work means many many
users have the power to spread information. This allows for distributed power of information but
also makes means that user-based interventions to hamper the spread of misinformation will be in-
effective. It is commonly stated that network metrics may identify key points where misinformation
diffusion can be stopped [24]. However, we find that not to be the case. The networks are too robust
to have a number of points that control diffusion. This may explain why disinformation tends to
repeatedly resurface [24]. While identifying key users spreading misinformation is useful for char-
acterizing efforts to share fake news, we must look beyond user-based interventions to actually fight
its spread.
6 Community Deception
The goal of community deception is to attack nodes or edge such that the modularity of the resulting
network is minimized [6]. The motivation behind this is typically privacy. Sensitive user data is
often over-mined, and network community information is one of the ways in which identifiable in-
formation can be discovered. The idea, then, is to alter the network such that community information
is harmed, as measured through modularity of the original network grouping.
Previously, modularity-impact attacks were used to maximize network fragmentation. However,
fragmentation is only a by-product of the modularity-impact attack. The attack’s true objective is to
maximize modularity. As shown in Figure 5, the same attack used to fragment the Election Week
network, increases its modularity. In fact, all of the fragmentation methods increase modularity. By
attacking nodes which bridge communities, the communities become more separated and modularity
increases. The figure shows that the different attacks give similar change in modularity, though the
mod-impact approach is most efficient.
(a) Modularity by nodes removed. (b) Modularity by edges removed.
Figure 5: Changes in modularity due to the fragmentation attacks, all using the initial strategy.
However, for community deception the true power of the modularity-impact method is the ability
to reverse it. Since community deception seeks to minimize modularity, the attack can simply be
reversed by selecting the node with the highest negative modularity-impact. Thus, a greedy solution
to the community-deception problem is a recomputed, reversed, modularity-impact attack. A faster
approximation to this is the initial, reversed, modularity-impact attack.
The previous approach to community deception relied on a genetic algorithm to select nodes or
edges to remove [6]. Genetic algorithms are difficult to scale, and as such the method could only
be applied to networks with a few hundred nodes. By leveraging the modularity equation itself, we
can select nodes guaranteed to maximize modularity in a scalable way. As a demonstration of this,
community-deception was performed on the Canadian Election network, and the results are given
in Figure 6, for both the fast approximation of the greedy approach. For networks of this scale, even
the greedy approach is very expensive. Using the initial attack strategy, modularity can be dropped
from approximately 0.7 to just over 0.5 by removing less than 1% of nodes, as shown in Figure 6 (a).
However, Figure 6 (b) shows that this comes at a cost of 20% of the nodes edges. Modularity can be
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decreased further, though with diminishing returns. Modularity levels out when about 50% of nodes
and 55% of edges are removed, resulting in a final modularity of 0.33, which is a 48% decrease.
We know from the modularity-impact equation that this strategy is attacking hubs, and this is seen by
the fact that the first 1% of nodes targeted are accounting for 20% of links. Intuitively, this suggests
that a user’s connections to Twitter accounts that are popular within a community reveal that users
identity as a community member. If this identity is to be protected, then hiding these key hubs, as
measured through modularity impact, is the most effective strategy.
(a) Modularity by nodes removed. (b) Modularity by edges removed.
Figure 6: Community deception on the Election-Week Network using the initial attack strategy.
Modularity as a function of fraction of nodes removed is given on the left. The right Figure shows
the same but as a function of the fraction of remaining edges.
A choice must be made when performing community-deception: At what point is does the cost of
deleting network data outweigh the benefit of decreased modularity? For this case, if only nodes
are of interest, there is only a very small price to pay to decrease modularity by 28%. If edges are
important to consider, the cost is higher. This is only an approximation of the greedy approach.
So the greedy approach, recomputed reversed mod-impact attack, will likely achieve even better
results. A study of this comparison on smaller networks along with non-greedy alternatives is left
for future work. In addition to this, explicit modularity maximization through node removal could
have interesting applications, such as node filtering to obtain more interpretable groups. This, too,
is left for future work.
7 Conclusion
Both centrality measures and community detection are core research areas in Network Science. At
the intersection of these areas, group-centrality measures attempt to quantify how central nodes
are given a network partition. While much of the work in community detection has focused on
modularity maximization, the current group-centrality measures are not strongly tied to modularity.
Here, we propose modularity-impact, which measures the modularity of a network and its partition
if a node were to be removed. This measure is directly derived from the modularity equation, giving
the measure a strong link to community detection theory. Like existing group-centrality measures,
modularity-impact scales to massive networks.
Unlike existing measures, however, modularity-impact not only quantifies how important a node is,
but in which way it is important. Once groups are introduced, nodes can take on two central roles:
hubs within their community, and bridges between communities. The role is encoded in the sign of
modularity-impact; nodes with positive values are bridges, while negative-valued nodes are hubs.
Modularity-impact was tested in three settings: generated cellular networks, the Pennsylvania Road
Network, and a Twitter network capturing conversation around the Canadian Election of 2019. In
these tests, we saw that modularity-based methods outperformed existing group centralities as mea-
sured through network fragmentation. Our results show that the Pennsylvania Road network is
over 8.5 times more fragile than the existing measures would have concluded, and that community
bridges play a more important role than community-hubs. Further, we saw that the social media
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conversation network is very robust, and that both community-hubs and community-bridges play
important roles in that robustness. This robustness suggest that user-based interventions are not an
effective strategy to fight the spread of misinformation.
Many prior group-centralities give preference to community-bridges over community-hubs. Using
mod-impact without taking the absolute value also targets bridges instead of hubs. Based on this,
we propose a tweak to Ghalmane’s generalized group-centrality measure where bridges are favored
instead of hubs. This alternate version of their group-centrality when applied with degree performed
better in our experiments. Further studies could explore if this change is an improvement when
combined with classical centrality measures other than degree.
Lastly, we recognize that mod-impact can be used as a greedy solution to the community-deception
problem. Community-deception seeks to remove nodes or edges to maximally reduce modularity,
which could be important for privacy protection in data distribution. While previous work uses
a genetic algorithm to select nodes or edges which may reduce modularity, but mod-impact can
be used to select the node that will maximally decrease modularity. Recomputing mod-impact at
each removal provides a full-greedy solution of the community-deception problem, but we use the
faster approximation: only calculating mod-impact once. While the genetic algorithm could scale
to networks with two hundred nodes, the approximation of the greedy method scales to networks
with millions of nodes and hundreds of millions of links, as demonstrated on the election week
network. Through this demonstration we see that modularity can be decreased by almost 30% while
only removing less than 1% of nodes, but this comes at a cost of 20% of the nodes edges. Still,
community-deception is a combinatorial optimization problem, so there are almost definitely better
solutions. Going forward, the greedy approach using mod-impact may be a useful baseline.
We have demonstrated that modularity-impact is a powerful method of finding nodes that bridge
communities or are hubs within their communities at scale. This work has many applications to areas
such as infrastructure robustness, traffic improvement, immunization, and social media. Deeper
dives into these application areas using the techniques proposed here could be fruitful areas of future
research.
17
References
[1] Vincent D Blondel, Jean-Loup Guillaume, Renaud Lambiotte, and Etienne Lefebvre. Fast
unfolding of communities in large networks. Journal of statistical mechanics: theory and
experiment, 2008(10):P10008, 2008.
[2] Ulrik Brandes. A faster algorithm for betweenness centrality. Journal of mathematical sociol-
ogy, 25(2):163–177, 2001.
[3] Ulrik Brandes, Daniel Delling, Marco Gaertler, Robert Gorke, Martin Hoefer, Zoran Nikoloski,
and Dorothea Wagner. On modularity clustering. IEEE transactions on knowledge and data
engineering, 20(2):172–188, 2007.
[4] Duncan S Callaway, Mark EJ Newman, Steven H Strogatz, and Duncan J Watts. Network
robustness and fragility: Percolation on random graphs. Physical review letters, 85(25):5468,
2000.
[5] Kathleen M Carley, Guido Cervone, Nitin Agarwal, and Huan Liu. Social cyber-security. In
International Conference on Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling and Prediction
and Behavior Representation in Modeling and Simulation, pages 389–394. Springer, 2018.
[6] Jinyin Chen, Lihong Chen, Yixian Chen, Minghao Zhao, Shanqing Yu, Qi Xuan, and Xiaoniu
Yang. Ga-based q-attack on community detection. IEEE Transactions on Computational
Social Systems, 6(3):491–503, 2019.
[7] Aaron Clauset, Mark EJ Newman, and Cristopher Moore. Finding community structure in
very large networks. Physical review E, 70(6):066111, 2004.
[8] Bruno Requio da Cunha, Juan Carlos Gonzlez-Avella, and Sebastin Gonalves. Fast Fragmen-
tation of Networks Using Module-Based Attacks. PLOS ONE, 10(11):e0142824, November
2015.
[9] Bruno Requiao da Cunha, Juan Carlos Gonza´lez-Avella, and Sebastia´n Gonc¸alves. Fast frag-
mentation of networks using module-based attacks. PloS one, 10(11):e0142824, 2015.
[10] Zakariya Ghalmane, Mohammed El Hassouni, Chantal Cherifi, and Hocine Cherifi. Centrality
in modular networks. EPJ Data Science, 8(1):1–27, December 2019. Number: 1 Publisher:
SpringerOpen.
[11] Zakariya Ghalmane, Mohammed El Hassouni, and Hocine Cherifi. Immunization of networks
with non-overlapping community structure. Social Network Analysis and Mining, 9(1):45,
2019.
[12] Michelle Girvan and Mark EJ Newman. Community structure in social and biological net-
works. Proceedings of the national academy of sciences, 99(12):7821–7826, 2002.
[13] Naveen Gupta, Anurag Singh, and Hocine Cherifi. Centrality measures for networks with
community structure. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 452:46–59, 2016.
[14] Petter Holme, Beom Jun Kim, Chang No Yoon, and Seung Kee Han. Attack vulnerability of
complex networks. Physical review E, 65(5):056109, 2002.
[15] William Ogilvy Kermack and Anderson G McKendrick. A contribution to the mathematical
theory of epidemics. Proceedings of the royal society of london. Series A, Containing papers
of a mathematical and physical character, 115(772):700–721, 1927.
[16] David MJ Lazer, Matthew A Baum, Yochai Benkler, Adam J Berinsky, Kelly M Greenhill,
Filippo Menczer, Miriam J Metzger, Brendan Nyhan, Gordon Pennycook, David Rothschild,
et al. The science of fake news. Science, 359(6380):1094–1096, 2018.
[17] Jure Leskovec, Daniel Huttenlocher, and Jon Kleinberg. Signed networks in social media. In
Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on human factors in computing systems, pages 1361–
1370, 2010.
[18] Jure Leskovec, Kevin J Lang, Anirban Dasgupta, and Michael W Mahoney. Community struc-
ture in large networks: Natural cluster sizes and the absence of large well-defined clusters.
Internet Mathematics, 6(1):29–123, 2009.
[19] Naoki Masuda. Immunization of networks with community structure. New Journal of Physics,
11(12):123018, 2009.
18
[20] Engineering National Academies of Sciences and Medicine. A Decadal Survey of the Social
and Behavioral Sciences: A Research Agenda for Advancing Intelligence Analysis. The Na-
tional Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2019.
[21] Mark EJ Newman. Finding community structure in networks using the eigenvectors of matri-
ces. Physical review E, 74(3):036104, 2006.
[22] Mark EJ Newman. Modularity and community structure in networks. Proceedings of the
national academy of sciences, 103(23):8577–8582, 2006.
[23] Juan G Restrepo, Edward Ott, and Brian R Hunt. Weighted percolation on directed networks.
Physical review letters, 100(5):058701, 2008.
[24] Jieun Shin, Lian Jian, Kevin Driscoll, and Franc¸ois Bar. The diffusion of misinformation on
social media: Temporal pattern, message, and source. Computers in Human Behavior, 83:278–
287, 2018.
[25] Kai Shu, H Russell Bernard, and Huan Liu. Studying fake news via network analysis: detection
and mitigation. In Emerging Research Challenges and Opportunities in Computational Social
Network Analysis and Mining, pages 43–65. Springer, 2019.
[26] Vincent A Traag, Ludo Waltman, and Nees Jan van Eck. From louvain to leiden: guaranteeing
well-connected communities. Scientific reports, 9(1):1–12, 2019.
[27] Stanley Wasserman, Katherine Faust, et al. Social network analysis: Methods and applications,
volume 8. Cambridge university press, 1994.
[28] Shuang-Hong Yang, Alexander J Smola, Bo Long, Hongyuan Zha, and Yi Chang. Friend or
frenemy? predicting signed ties in social networks. In Proceedings of the 35th international
ACM SIGIR conference on Research and development in information retrieval, pages 555–564,
2012.
19
Appendix A: Community-Degree
An un-signed measure of group-centrality could be created based on the modularity-impact equation.
Though the signed aspect of modularity-impact is quite-useful, it is possible that a node has high
positive and negative components of modularity in Equation 10, resulting in a modularity-impact
near zero. These node may be particularly important for networks with low modularity. Thus, using
Equation 10, one final measure can be derived:
CDi =
1
4 (M − ki)2
∑
c∈C
(dc + hi,c)
2 (13)
This measure is high for both hubs and bridges, with hubs getting slight preference. Again, attach-
ment to large groups is favored over attachment to small groups. Since this is just weighting the
degree, we will cal it Community-Degree (CD). The previous results including this measure are
shown in Tables 4-7, and in Figures 7 and 8.
Method MI AMI CD AMC-D Mas CHB MC-D Deg
Initial Cρ 0.165 0.211 0.361 0.169 0.198 0.383 0.381 0.347
Initial Cη 0.247 0.308 0.560 0.268 0.293 0.576 0.599 0.578
MBA Cρ 0.086 0.087 0.099 0.088 0.090 0.101 0.103 0.100
MBA Cη 0.157 0.162 0.210 0.173 0.162 0.211 0.219 0.216
Recomputed Cρ 0.107 0.126 0.320 0.130 0.132 0.331 0.337 0.309
Recomputed Cη 0.188 0.205 0.599 0.221 0.205 0.608 0.616 0.586
Table 4: Extended version of Table 2 to include Community-Degree. Results for attacks on the
generated cellular networks. The values shown are the average over 100 simulations. Methods
introduced in this work are on the left of the double column. The best results are emboldened.
Network MI AMI CD AMC-D Mas CHB MC-D Deg
PA-Roads Cρ 0.013 0.015 0.126 0.015 0.169 0.157 0.111 0.122
PA-Roads Cη 0.020 0.026 0.264 0.026 0.300 0.281 0.243 0.305
Election Cρ 0.430 0.032 0.023 0.022 0.067 0.029 0.023 0.022
Election Cη 0.636 0.673 0.661 0.656 0.732 0.667 0.654 0.651
Table 5: Extended version of Table 3 to include Community-Degree. Results for initial attacks on
the PA-Road Network and the Canadian-Election Twitter Network. Methods introduced in this work
are on the left of the double column. The best results are emboldened.
Community-Degree is highly correlated with degree, and so performs similarly. Based on these
results, it seems that the signed centrality is more effective while also conveying more information.
Appendix B: Results on Other Generated Networks
For completeness, networks lacking strong group structure were generated. Scale-free networks
were generated using the Baraba´si-Albert model using parameters n = 1000, m = 8, and γ = 1.5.
Over the 100 iterations tested the average modularity from Leiden grouping was 0.196. The results
are given in Table 6.
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks with parameters n = 1000, p = 0.015, were also created. These parameters
were chosen to give similar density to the cellular networks previously studied. Networks were
generated until a connected network was reached. Over the 100 connected networks, the average
modularity from Leiden grouping was 0.240. The results are given in Table 7.
The results across network types are similar. First, none of the attacks are very effective. Both the
node and edge cost are higher than that seen for the Election network, which was robust. With that
said, the degree and modular-degree attacks were consistently the most efficient in terms of nodes.
This is intuitive; without more meaningful structure, the most effective strategy is to look at the node
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Figure 7: Extended version of Figure 3 to include Community-Degree. Kendall-Tau Correlation of
the “initial” attack strategies on the PA Roads Network.
Figure 8: Extended version of Figure 4 to include Community-Degree. Kendall-Tau Correlation of
the “initial” attack strategies on the PA Roads Network.
with the most edges. This results in a high edge-based cost, however. So we see that modularity-
impact actually performs best in terms of edge-cost. Lastly, we see that the adjusted-modular degree
that we proposed performs similarly to the original. Adjusted measure performs much better on
highly modular networks, while performing similarly on less modular networks.
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Method MI AMI CD AMC-D Mas CHB MC-D Deg
Initial Cρ 0.483 0.424 0.263 0.256 0.337 0.361 0.254 0.243
Initial Cη 0.834∗ 0.856 0.882 0.881 0.884 0.879 0.881 0.880
MBA Cρ 0.430 0.364 0.243 0.239 0.273 0.292 0.242 0.235
MBA Cη 0.839 0.859 0.880 0.880 0.881 0.877 0.880 0.880
Recomputed Cρ 0.296 0.305 0.224 0.227 0.256 0.258 0.223∗ 0.223∗
Recomputed Cη 0.878 0.878 0.880 0.880 0.882 0.881 0.880 0.880
Table 6: Results for attacks on the generated scale free networks. The values shown are the average
over 100 simulations. Methods introduced in this work are on the left of the double column. The
best results by method are emboldened. The best results overall are marked with a star.
Method MI AMI CD AMC-D Mas CHB MC-D Deg
Initial Cρ 0.493 0.491 0.479 0.475 0.487 0.492 0.473 0.472
Initial Cη 0.683 0.681 0.715 0.723 0.705 0.675∗ 0.724 0.728
MBA Cρ 0.483 0.484 0.469 0.466 0.475 0.485 0.464 0.462
MBA Cη 0.683 0.681 0.714 0.722 0.705 0.675∗ 0.724 0.727
Recomputed Cρ 0.461 0.482 0.429∗ 0.454 0.452 0.446 0.430 0.430
Recomputed Cη 0.700 0.681 0.739 0.739 0.729 0.718 0.738 0.740
Table 7: Results for attacks on the generated Erdo˝s-Re´nyi networks. The values shown are the
average over 100 simulations. Methods introduced in this work are on the left of the double column.
The best results by method are emboldened. The best results overall are marked with a star.
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